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Coronavirus and the economy: what 
can be done? 
By David Hearne, Researcher, Centre for Brexit Studies 
Or, more specifically, what can be done by government? I’ve 
spoken previously on this blog about the ways in which government is 
fundamentally different to a household. However, the current crisis is 
very different to a normal recession (and Brexit is totally different 
again). 
Economics undergraduates are typically taught to distinguish between 
the “short run” (i.e. relatively short term changes) and the “long run”. 
It’s frustrating to students that we cannot put a neat time period on 
these two: their definitions change with context. 
I actually dislike the dichotomy and find that it can be deeply 
unhelpful, although it cannot be denied that it’s a useful pedagogical 
device[1]. In a “normal” recession, demand for goods and services 
falls. The reasons for this might vary, but the outcome is the same. 
Theoretically, prices could adjust to ensure that this is the end of the 
matter, but for various reasons in the real world prices appear to be 
“sticky” – they don’t change instantly[2]. 
As a result, a greater value of goods and services are produced than 
people are willing to purchase. If prices don’t adjust quickly enough 
then quantities must change instead[3]: people put off that 
discretionary purchase for another few months until the situation 
becomes clearer. 
If fewer goods and services need to be produced then unemployment 
typically rises (both from firms laying off workers and from firms going 
bankrupt). This further reduces demand and so the cycle continues. 
Governments and central banks typically react to recessions by 
seeking to boost demand. In normal times, this is mostly (but not 
exclusively due to so-called “automatic stabilisers”, like unemployment 
benefits) done via changes in interest rates. When interest rates are 
near their lower bound (as they currently are), such changes are most 
effectively wrought through fiscal policy. 
What we are currently witnessing looks nothing like that. Yes, 
economic demand (in the aggregate) almost certainly has fallen, but 
the primary effect thus far has been a massive (but hopefully 
temporary!) fall in the quantity of goods and services that the 
economy can produce (a supply side effect). 
The entire hospitality sector has effectively shut down, as have all 
conferences. International travel has largely evaporated (at least for 
Europeans) and domestic travel has fallen by over 75%. Sales of 
consumer durables have evaporated – even if you wanted to the 
restrictions make it tricky to buy a car at the moment, especially if the 
vehicle is second-hand. 
Huge chunks of the rest of the economy – from education through to 
various professional services and manufacturing – are operating at 
reduced capacity. Measures to boost consumer (and business) 
demand are therefore likely to be largely futile, since the production of 
goods and services is so limited. 
Why, therefore, are people (including yours truly) advocating massive 
fiscal stimuli, of the sort more normally associated with measures to 
combat a traditional recession? The answer is redistribution. This 
might sit uncomfortably with many, but it is incontrovertible. 
How are we redistributing? We are redistributing across both time and 
space. Government borrowing is a transfer over time: it is an attempt 
to move future consumption into the present. At its most fundamental, 
people in future will need to pay higher taxes in order that people 
today are able to eat. 
However, there is also significant distribution across space, although 
this is more subtle. Had the government not stepped in to help those 
whose livelihoods had (hopefully very temporarily!) disappeared then 
they would have had to reduce their consumption, sell assets and 
borrow in order to survive. 
Prices would have fallen and those fortunate enough to still have a 
source of income would have had to buy those assets (cheaply) and 
lend any income that they couldn’t (or chose not to) spend in the 
current period. A significant amount would probably also have flowed 
to the owners of financial intermediaries (mostly shareholders in 
banks etc.) 
It is worth pointing out that the government has stepped in to control 
both the flow and cost of credit, which amounts to a form of rationing. 
The upshot is that the consumption off those who had lost their 
livelihoods would have been permanently lower, whilst those who 
have retained an income would be permanently better off. 
My personal view is that redistributing to ensure that the costs of the 
Covid-19 outbreak are more evenly spread is the right thing to do. 
After all, it is nobody’s fault that they are laid off, or unable to open 
their business at the present time. Be under no illusion, however: the 
current furlough scheme is an extraordinarily generous form of (time 
limited and conditional) unemployment benefit (and a more modest 
business support mechanism). 
However, the current situation is not unique. This is not the first 
recession we have experienced, nor will it be the last. A great many 
people lose their jobs each year – most through no fault of their own. 
If we can afford to support those who would otherwise struggle to put 
food on the table in the current climate, we can afford to do the same 
more generally. 
It behoves those of us who are fortunate to help those who are not. I 
believe that we have a moral obligation to do so. Traditionally, the 
challenge has been to design a mechanism to do so that still 
incentivises people to earn their own living where they can. However, 
there is a method that can do so: an appropriately set basic income 
(or negative income tax) ensures that nobody need be destitute, whilst 
giving people a strong incentive to earn a living so that they can 
improve their standard of living. 
[1] It’s also true that the more deeply one thinks about the notion, the 
less useful the two concepts become. Keynes famously quipped that 
“in the long-run, we are all dead” and this has a ring of truth to it. After 
all, the “long run” is made up of myriad “short runs” (I sound like I’m 
talking about a marathon!) Back in the 1980s, Olivier Blanchard and 
many others began discussing the concept of hysteresis: my own 
view is that altering short-run outcomes can induce long-run effects 
and so the dichotomy is somewhat artificial. Of course, this is not to 
deny the importance of factors contributing to long-run outcomes, but 
simply to point out the complexity of what are ultimately dynamic 
systems driven by myriad human decisions and interactions. 
[2] A lot of this appears to be a combination of contractual and 
temporal factors. Rents typically change annually and there are non-
trivial costs to moving for both landlords and tenants. Housing costs 
make up approximately 23% of the CPIH. Similarly, many transport 
prices are set annually using a predetermined formula. Temporal 
issues (“fixed” costs like business rates and business rates) change 
slowly and hedging (especially currency hedging) can slow the rate at 
which some prices change as firms are reticent about making a loss 
on production. 
[3] The lumpiness of certain purchases – especially consumer 
durables like cars – might be a factor here. A 5% (or even a 10%) 
reduction in price is probably not going to be sufficient to induce you 
to make a purchase now rather than deferring it due to uncertainty. 
 
